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UNCLAS KUWAIT 004428

SIPDIS

DEPT FOR S/CT KINCANNON AND MCCUTCHAN, NEA/ARPI FOR BERNIS

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TAGS: [PTER](#) [ASEC](#) [KCRM](#) [EFIN](#) [KHLs](#) [KPAO](#) [KU](#)

SUBJECT: Kuwait: 2004 Annual Terrorism Report Draft

REF: State 245841

[1](#)1. (U) Embassy Kuwait's submission for the 2004 Patterns of Global Terrorism report is provided below. The text will also be submitted electronically as instructed reftel. Addendum information will be provided septel. Post contact is Political Chief Natalie E. Brown who can be reached at BrownNE2@state.gov.

[1](#)2. (U) Begin text:  
Kuwait continued to engage with the U.S. Government and with its neighbors to thwart domestic threats to Kuwaiti and foreign interests. It also continued to provide significant support to U.S. efforts to stem terror financing. Following the four terror attacks carried out against Operation Iraqi Freedom and Coalition Forces between October 2002 and December 2003 -- which resulted in the death of one U.S. Marine and a U.S. defense contractor -- the Government of Kuwait (GOK) strengthened domestic counterterrorism efforts, but the potential for further attacks remains a serious concern.

The Kuwaiti Government has taken some measures to bolster security and enhance protection for Coalition Forces transiting Kuwait. Kuwait State Security (KSS) has worked to identify and arrest terror suspects, but the office of the public prosecutor claims that insufficient, concrete information has hampered the conviction of many suspected terrorists. Those actually sentenced to jail for recruiting, supporting, or being a terrorist have often had their sentences suspended or commuted to a nominal fine.

As part of its campaign against terror, the GOK formed in October a ministerial committee chaired by the Minister of Awqaf and Islamic Affairs to develop strategies to combat terror and extremists. Kuwaiti officials and clerics also denounced terror attacks in the region and sharply criticized those who condoned them. In November, the Government forbade Kuwaiti ministries and religious institutions from extending official invitations to 29 Saudi clerics who reportedly signed a statement in support of jihad in Iraq. No entry ban was imposed, however, and at least one cleric visited the homes of some Members of Parliament and other private gatherings, sparking widespread public criticism of the cleric's presence. The Islamic political bloc has been critical of the Government's methods in confronting and dealing with Islamic extremists.

Following the December 6 attack on U.S. Consulate General Jeddah, the Government of Kuwait augmented security around U.S. installations in Kuwait. In addition, Kuwait, responded quickly to U.S. concerns about a possible terror attack in December, reviewing security and initiating a search for the individual believed to be the source of the threats. Kuwaiti officials have also heightened security along their border with Iraq to prevent militant infiltration and have also worked with Syria and Iran to develop procedures to increase intelligence sharing and enhance customs and border-monitoring cooperation. In July, Syria repatriated to Kuwait four minors and one adult recruited to carry out suicide bomb attacks in Iraq. Kuwait subsequently arrested up to 12 Kuwaitis reportedly being trained to attack U.S. and Coalition Forces in Iraq. To the best of our knowledge, all but two of them have been released on bail.

Kuwait also continued to implement every U.S.-ordered terrorist-fund freeze. In August 2003, the Government froze the assets of HAMAS over the objections of some elements of the Kuwaiti population.

Kuwait is a party to ten of the 12 international conventions and protocols relating to terrorism. Kuwait is not party to the Convention for the Suppression of the Financing of Terrorism or the Convention for the Suppression of Terrorist Bo